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The EU-Russia relationship at a 
turning point
The Russian-Ukrainian gas conflict
Over the past years, the EU-Russia relations were char-
acterized by a growing crisis of  trust. As compared to 
the 1990s, both sides seem to know less and less about 
one another and understand the position of  the other 
less and less. The gas crisis represents a new critical 
climax within the relationship between the EU and 
Russia as well as between Russia and Ukraine: Moscow 
and Kiev have proved to be little reliable partners, by 
escalating their dispute right up to closing down gas 
deliveries, without considering the EU countries. For 
the first time, Russia interrupted its gas deliveries to 
Europe for a longer period of  time. At the same time, 
Ukraine instrumentalized its transit monopoly for 
Russian gas supplies with regard to the deliveries from 
East to West for its own interests. Within the EU, this 
crisis sparked a debate about greater diversification 
and less dependence on the energy supply from Russia 
and the Ukraine. Instead of  Russia, Central Asia could 
now rise to become the preferred energy partner of  
the EU. The growing European interest in the alterna-
tive pipeline Nabucco could be interpreted as a direct 
consequence of  the Georgia War and the gas crisis. 
The German side combines this with the demand for 
clear rules governing the transit of  raw materials to 
be included in the new Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement with Russia. Furthermore, a clear mes-
sage is to be sent out to Ukraine signaling that their 
non-transparent behavior in the gas conflict was not 
conducive for a NATO or EU membership. 
The Eastern Partnership of the EU
The Eastern Partnership of  the EU, initiated by Poland 
and Sweden, is a central subject of  the Czech Council 
Presidency during the first half  of  2009. The aim is to 
strengthen regional cooperation with the five Eastern 
EU neighbor states—Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, 
Moldova, Ukraine—and to establish at least a techni-
cal cooperation with Belarus. Both Prague as well as 
the initiators of  this strategy want to embrace a more 
multilateral approach and move away from the previ-
ous bilateralism with the Eastern neighbors. In order 
to achieve this goal, the areas of  security, good gover-
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nance and economic reforms are to be supported with 
further funds in the years to come. It is stressed, by 
way of  principle, that the Eastern Partnership is not 
directed against Russia. This concept is rather a reac-
tion to the deficits of  the previous European Neigh-
borhood Policy (ENP), which lacked the incentives 
for progress in the reform process without automatic 
prospects of  membership. The Eastern Partnership 
is not to represent a back door way into accession, 
however, further incentives for integration and re-
forms could be provided. The gas crisis has shown 
how important the normalization of  EU relations 
with Ukraine and Belarus is. At the same time, Russia 
has to be included in this policy, so that no geo-politi-
cal competition starts to develop. German politicians 
demand an improvement in the collaboration within 
the Organization of  Black Sea Economic Cooperation, 
as an integral part of  the future Eastern Partnership of  
the EU, for instance, on energy issues.
The Russian side put forward the argument that the 
Georgia War, in particular, was a good example for the 
cooperation between Russia and the EU. Despite this 
war, the good relations in the areas of  the economy, 
energy, education and the sciences have not been 
damaged. The Russian leadership is planning to put 
forward concrete proposals for the new Partnership 
and Cooperation Agreement at the coming EU-Russia 
summit. On the other hand, the Eastern Partnership is 
regarded by Moscow as a project that is aimed directly 
against Russia. In order to eliminate irritations, the 
Russian government would wish to be invited to the 
EU negotiations with the post-Soviet countries. Had 
Russia been included in these negotiations from the 
very beginning, a critical position would never have 
developed. The EU side emphasizes that the Eastern 
Partnership is still at a fledgling stage. Had one in-
cluded Russia from the outset, a further development 
would have become difficult. Russia had not have in-
vited the EU as an observer for the constitution of  the 
Eurasian Economic Community either. In the further 
process, the Czech Presidency aims to include Russia 
into the Neighborhood Policy, however. “Thematic 
Platforms” are to be developed as a multilateral policy, 
into which Russia could also be integrated. Russia is 
planning to hold so-called “regional forums”, for in-
stance, with the Baltic states on the subject of  strategic 
neighborhood.
Chances for a strategic partnership with Russia
For Russia, there is a fundamental interest in a strategic 
cooperation with the EU. The EU was the “natural 
partner” of  Russia, still, Moscow could often not fully 
comprehend the European decision-making processes. 
Disagreement within the Union on the issue of  Russia 
policy encumbered any cooperation. Moscow regards 
the communication with 27 member states as an 
obstacle to constructive dialogue. The Russian lead-
ership would prefer a simpler and less controversial 
mechanism in its relations with the EU. In principle, 
the EU-Russia relationship needed an intellectual push 
to emerge from the crisis. Even though the relations 
were characterized by stability over the past years, this 
was regarded as a given situation and was not devel-
oped any further. A way out of  the sluggish negotiat-
ing process for a new Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement could be a brief  general document each 
side could quickly agree on. This document could be 
followed up by sectoral agreements, which could be 
attached to the general agreement as protocols. This 
would circumvent the problems of  achieving agree-
ment in all areas, including the problematic ones, be-
fore the agreement is signed. The EU should develop 
a Russia policy of  its own, independent of  the US. It 
cannot be a bridge between Russia and the US, as it is 
conducting totally different discourses with either state. 
Even though there might be common goals between 
Moscow and Brussels for the direct neighborhood, 
however, there are also contradictory ideas about the 
development of  this area. Above all, the EU should 
differentiate between shared values and shared inter-
ests. It is a European illusion to believe that geopolitics 
is an outdated concept. This is a concept that con-
tinues to determine state cooperation in Europe for 
Russia.
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Russia and the EU—partners in the  
financial crisis
The financial crisis has hit Russia especially severely. 
The consequences are the enormous inflation of  the 
rouble, a decline in state revenues due to the drop in 
the price of  raw materials as well as dwindling produc-
tion, especially in growth sectors as the automotive 
industry. The rate of  unemployment is rising rapidly 
in the country. However, there is the danger in Rus-
sia that too much regulation might be introduced 
together with the state salvaging packages and thus 
thwart growth in the future. There are two extreme 
scenarios for the Russian government for 2009: in case 
of  a positive development, there might be a growth 
rate of  3 percent. On the other hand, the most nega-
tive assumption predicts a decline of  growth to -10 
percent. The Russian leadership is preparing for both 
scenarios. Russia’s problem is to be seen in a lack of  
crisis management and a state that was too directive 
already before the crisis. The Russian side regards the 
financial crisis also as a chance for closer cooperation 
with the EU, as it needs the Europeans all the more as 
partners for modernization. 
Backed up with the third largest international currency 
reserves, the Russian leadership could partly cush-
ion the negative consequences of  the financial crisis 
with the right decisions. EU participants criticized 
that the main problem of  the past years has been the 
prevention of  many foreign investments due to state 
intervention. The enormous currency reserves could 
only develop a short-term effect due to the structural 
deficits. In the long term, these measures would peter 
out as there was no competitive industry and, above 
all, the infrastructure would have to be modernized 
comprehensively.
EU-Russia—What lies ahead?
Generally, there are three questions to be addressed 
currently in the relations between Russia and the EU:
1) Will the financial crisis deepen the trenches between 
Russia and the EU further, or, on the contrary, 
strengthen the partnership? 
2) What role will the new US-President Barack Obama 
play in the relations of  the West with Russia? 
3) What are the common strategic goals pursued by 
Russia and the EU? 
Representatives of  the German economy stress that 
European banks are not planning a withdrawal from 
Russia, despite the financial crisis. However, the Rus-
sian state should not take over control of  the entire 
banking system. Transparency was decisive for future 
cooperation. In order to leave stagnation behind, new 
structures needed to be created for dialogue. The only 
right strategy for the EU with regard to Russia can be 
dialogue and not containment. Leading politicians of  
the German government are demanding a new mecha-
nism of  communication with Russia. Six countries es-
pecially interested in the relations with Russia—among 
others apart from France and Germany also Poland—
should be included. 
Russia accepted the EU as a mediator in the Georgia 
conflict and the gas crisis. Especially energy policy 
could become a strategic instrument of  cooperation 
between Moscow and Brussels. If  it is possible to 
create trust in this area, then it will be possible to do 
so also in other areas. Close cooperation in energy 
policy would require amended investment rules, state 
influence on the economy, control of  the pipeline 
system as well as common environmental and climate 
demands. At the same time, the Russian proposal for 
a new European security system should be discussed 
more seriously, as the most recent conflicts showed 
up many deficits in communication. Both the Georgia 
crisis and the gas conflict were predictable without the 
possibility of  a solution being available for the preven-
tion of  the conflicts beforehand. For the future one 
should find multilateral mechanisms for the prevention 
of  conflicts or for avoiding escalation. This calls in the 
same way both on the EU and Russia. 
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